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Constructing Reality: Social Science and
Race Cases
BEVERLY I. MORAN*
When the Northern Illinois University Law Review planned its sym-
posium on Grutter v. Bollinger,' the decision was still working its way
through the courts and speculation on the future of affirmative action was
rampant. The Supreme Court's subsequent decision to permit considera-
tions of race in the admissions process reflects a number of factors, includ-
ing the over eighty amicus briefs Grutter generated, the vast majority of
which presented social science studies and perspectives. This essay is in-
spired by those briefs, the largest number ever submitted in a single case
before the Court,2 and the faith they show in social science, racial justice
and law.
Given the depth of America's race conflicts, intense interest in con-
tributing to the Grutter decision is no surprise. Nevertheless, each side's
reliance on social science is arresting. Viewing Grutter v. Bollinger against
other canonical American race cases, it does not necessarily follow that
social science is the best way to address the questions Grutter raised; and
yet, social science was clearly the method of choice. What gave those who
submitted amicus briefs faith that social science studies strengthened their
arguments, and what does that trust tell us as we evaluate future means of
achieving racial justice?
My argument is that social science in race cases is either a recent phe-
nomena or as old as the cases themselves, depending on how one defines
social science. Further, whatever one's definition and regardless of
* Professor of Law and Sociology, Vanderbilt University Law School. I would like
to thank M. Cristina Medina of the Monterey College of Law for her research assistance, the
faculties of the Northern Illinois University School of Law and the Peabody College of
Education for their comments on earlier versions of this piece as well as Professor Stephanie
Wildman, director of the Center for Social Justice at the Santa Clara University School of
Law.
1. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). Grutter v. Bollinger, also known as the Michigan af-
firmative action case, concerned the affirmative action admissions plans at both the Univer-
sity of Michigan-Ann Arbor's undergraduate and law school programs. Although the Su-
preme Court ended up rejecting the undergraduate admissions program because of an auto-
matic point system, the same Court accepted the law school's more file-specific approach
that emphasized looking at the whole applicant and how his or her experiences would enrich
the entire law school class. See id.
2. Brendan Koerner, Do Judges Read Amicus Curiae Briefs?, SLAT MAGAZINE,
Apr. 1, 2003.
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whether social science is an old or a new strategy, its true contribution oc-
curs well before any litigation through its effect on public opinion. Public
opinion is important because judges are people who live in the world, and
the world that they live in is filled with beliefs about who people are and
what is just. In our century, it seems that social science often contributes to
how we comprehend society. In earlier centuries, what we now call natural
science or biology was another path people used to understand their world.
Sometimes judges explicitly turn to extra-legal sources in their decision
making and sometimes those sources are part of the background that judges
use less consciously. Whether conscious or unconscious, however, lawyers
working for social justice must understand how to use extra-legal sources
as part of their overall litigation strategy. If these lawyers wait until writ-
ing their briefs to draw on social, natural or biological science, they will be
too late. No one can absorb new information and change his or her mind in
the time that it takes to read a brief. Instead, the ideas expressed in a brief
must already exist in the public consciousness so that they are absorbed and
available to the judge at the time of decision making.
Further, the lawyer fighting for racial justice must understand that
what we know today can, and often does, change tomorrow. Memory is a
strange thing. Often it reflects both what we want to remember and what
we want to forget. Knowledge that was once influential is lost and be-
comes replaced by different stories and world views. It is important to
track these changes and make active efforts to change the course of mem-
ory when what we forget is just the thing that we most needed to remem-
ber.
To make these points, I review three classic cases from America's
race canon: Dred Scott v. Sanford,3 Plessy v. Ferguson4 and Brown v.
Board of Education.5
In Dred Scott v. Sanford, the Court set its task as determining whether
"the descendants of ... slaves, when they shall be emancipated ... are citi-
zens of a State, in the sense in which the word citizen is used in the Consti-
tution of the United States." 6 Because citizenship is as pure a legal ques-
3. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 403 (1856). Walter Ehrlich describes the
significance of the Dred Scott case this way:
The Dred Scott case began in St. Louis in 1846 as Dred Scott v. Irene
Emerson, a slave suing his mistress for freedom. Scott had lived in free
territory before returning to Missouri, and, by Missouri law, was thereby
entitled to freedom. Unforeseen developments delayed the litigation for
several years. Then, through no intention of either party, the case be-
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tion as any, we might expect a court to address a citizenship question
through statutes and constitutions rather than, for example, biology. Yet,
the Dred Scott Court expanded its analysis beyond legal texts to include
such extra-legal sources as history, biology and public opinion research.
For history, the Court incorrectly opined that "[n]o one of that race
had ever migrated to the United States voluntarily,"7 although, in fact, free
Africans voluntarily traveled through the Americas (including the British
colonies and, later, the United States) as immigrants, explorers and adven-
turers from the 15'h century onward.8
For public opinion research, the Court again misinformed its audience
by claiming that Europeans' fixed and universal opinion of Africans was
that Africans were "beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to asso-
ciate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far
inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to re-
spect." 9
came enmeshed in Missouri and national political debates involving
slavery. In 1850 Missouri's lower court declared Scott free. But in
1852, in a dramatically partisan pronouncement, the Missouri Supreme
Court reversed that decision, overturned numerous legal precedents, and
proclaimed controversial proslavery rhetoric to be law.
To enable the U.S. Supreme Court to clarify that law, St. Louis lawyers
instituted a new case, Dred Scott v. John F. A. Sanford, in the federal
courts. Specifically at issue was the "once free always free" doctrine-
whether a slave once emancipated could lose freedom by returning to a
slave state. During argument, though, counsel introduced additional is-
sues involving slavery and race. The Supreme Court could have simply
dismissed the suit on noncontroversial procedural grounds. Instead, the
Court's Southern proslavery majority chose to deal with volatile, sub-
stantive issues, thereby hoping to settle them permanently by judicial
authority.
Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney delivered the opinion of the Court on
6 March 1857. "Negroes of African descent," he decreed, could not be
citizens of the United States. The Missouri Compromise, which in 1820
had prohibited slavery in the territories, above the 36 [degree] 30 [min-
ute] line, was unconstitutional, Taney explained, because slaves were
property protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Finally,
the chief justice declared that an erstwhile emancipated slave who re-
turned to a slave state was restored to slavery if that was the law of the
state. In other words, "once free" no longer meant "always free."
Walter Ehrlich, Dred Scott Case, in THE DICTIONARY OF AFRo-AMERICAN SLAVERY 195
(Randall Miller & John Smith eds., 1988).
7. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 411.
8. JANE LANDERS, AGAINST THE ODDS: FREE BLACKS IN THE SLAVE SOCIETIES OF
THE AMERICAS (1996).
9. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407. Here again, the Court was not entirely accurate in
its use of extra-legal sources, for although it is true that many Europeans considered Afri-
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For biology, the Court informed us that "the negro might justly and
lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit."''
All three of these statements rely on extra-legal sources. There is no
statute, no judicial decision, no constitution or learned treatise supporting
the Court's historical, biological or sociological claims.
Each statement is also arguably irrelevant. Citizenship is often denied
to people who are in no way defective and are, in fact, well thought of.
There is no need to engage in racial calumny in order to deny a person citi-
zenship.
Yet, in the face of some bias against extra-legal sources and a question
that arguably requires only pure legal analysis, these three statements and
others like them throughout the opinion were important to the Justices who
put their names to the pronouncement. For them, the Constitution and re-
lated statutes standing alone were not enough, nor were the many other
judicial decisions they relied on or distinguished. Instead, these Justices
felt the need to bring the outside world into their analysis. That outside
world was filled with the misinformation that the Court presented in its
decision. The Justices truly believed that blacks were inferior and they had
the natural and social sciences to draw on for support. The views that they
expressed were not unique to them. These understandings came from the
cans inferior, that opinion was not shared by all Europeans across all time periods. For
example, at the very time that the Court found a universal belief in the right to enslave, the
Britain abolitionist movement was expanding through the creation of the Society for the
Abolition of the Slave Trade in 1787, and the Vermont Constitution of 1777 prohibited
slavery. A copy of the original 1777 Vermont Constitution can be found at the Yale Avalon
project at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/vtOl.htm. For more on the Society for
the Abolition of the Slave Trade, see JAMES WALVIN, THE SLAVE TRADE (1999) and HUGH
THOMAS, THE SLAVE TRADE: Tim STORY OF THE ATLANTc SLAVE TRADE 1440 TO 1870
(1997).
Further, there were a number of Africans throughout European history who
functioned in high positions in European society before, during and after the time discussed
by the Court. See, e.g., Alma C. Allen, Literary Relations Between Spain and Africa,
JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY, Apr. 1965, at 97-105; Martin Bernal, Black Athena: The African
and Levantine Roots of Greece, in AFRICAN PRESENCE IN EARLY EUROPE 66-82 (Ivan Van
Sertima ed., 1985); ALLISON BLAKELY, BLACKS IN THE DUTCH WORLD: THE EVOLUTION OF
RACIAL IMAGERY IN A MODERN SocmTY (1993); Allison Blakely, The Negro in Imperial
Russia: A Preliminary Sketch, JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY 61, No. 4, 351-61 (1976); DAVID
DABYDEEN, HOGARTH'S BLACKS: IMAGES OF BLACKS N EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLISH ART
(1987); Paul Edwards & James Walvin, Africans in Britain, 1500-1800, in THE AFRICAN
DIASPORA: INTERPRETIVE ESSAYS 173-204 (Martin L. Kilson & Robert I. Rotberg eds., 1976);
Asa G. Hilliard III, Blacks in Antiquity: A Review, in AFRICAN PRESENCE IN EARLY EUROPE
90-95 (Ivan Van Sertima ed., 1985); Clarence L Holte, The Black in Pre-Revolutionary
Russia, in AFRICAN PRESENCE IN EARLY EUROPE 261-75 (Ivan Van Sertima ed., 1985).
10. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407.
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social world around them. We might now claim that all these statements
are false, but they were as true to these Justices and their cohort as any fact
recited in a brief today.
In Plessy v. Ferguson," a man with seven white great grandparents
sued when he was removed from a "white only" railroad car, claiming that
transferring him to the "colored car" denied him a property right in his
reputation as a white person.' 2 The Supreme Court denied Plessy's claim
by relying on a mixture of legal analysis, biology and psychology.
Although the decision itself made clear that Plessy's complexion was
the same as others' who were routinely considered white, the Court's un-
derstanding of biology led it to opine that:
A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between
the white and colored races-a distinction which is
founded in the color of the two races, and which must al-
ways exist so long as white men are distinguished from the
other race by color-has no tendency to destroy the legal
11. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Robert P. Green, Jr. describes Plessy v. Ferguson this way:
On June 7, 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy ... boarded an East Louisiana
Railway train and took a seat designated for whites. When asked by the
conductor to move to the "colored" car, he refused and was immediately
arrested .... On May 18, 1896, Justice Henry Billings Brown delivered
the opinion of a near unanimous Court. Focusing on interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment as central to the issue, Brown cited the dis-
tinction that the Court had earlier made in the Slaughterhouse Cases be-
tween "the rights and immunities of citizens of the United States, as dis-
tinguished from those of citizens of the States," and sought to clarify the
kinds of rights protected from hostile state legislation. He concluded:
"The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute
equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it
could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color,
or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a com-
mingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws
permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are
liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority
of either race to the other, and have generally, if not universally, recog-
nized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise
of their police powers."
Robert P. Green, Jr., "Separate But Equal" Approved, in 2 HISTORIC U.S. COURT CASES: AN
ENCYCLOPEDIA 624, 627 (John W. Johnson ed., 2001).
12. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 547.
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equality of the two races, or reestablish a state of involun-
tary servitude.
13
Further, in response to the claim that this and other emerging Jim
Crow laws were meant to create a caste system with blacks at the bottom,
the Court's understanding of psychology led it to state that:
the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument ... con-
sist[s] in the assumption that the enforced separation of the
two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferior-
ity. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in
the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put
that construction upon it.' 4
In the 19th century, no one made much of the fact that the Supreme
Court employed social and natural science in its pronouncements. Neither
Justice Brown nor Justice Harlan in Plessy nor Justice Taney in Dred Scott
were surrounded by the interdisciplinary atmosphere emerging in law
schools today. Nor could they have imagined the explicit reliance on social
science that we see in Brown v. Board of Education. Their decisions un-
selfconsciously drew on what was around them, including the understand-
ings of the world reflected in what we now call natural and social science.
Almost sixty years later in the 20th century, our understanding of law
and social science had changed. By the time that Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation was decided, lawyers and courts were familiar with the explicit, self-
13. Id. at 543.
14. Id. at 551. Not to be outdone, the famous Harlan dissent also employs extra-
legal reasoning in the form of political science when the Justice points out that:
It was said in argument that the statute of Louisiana does not discrimi-
nate against either race, but prescribes a rule applicable alike to white
and colored citizens. But this argument does not meet the difficulty.
Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the pur-
pose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied
by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or as-
signed to white persons .... The thing to accomplish was, under the
guise of giving equal accommodation for whites and blacks, to compel
the latter to keep to themselves while [traveling] in railroad passenger
coaches. No one would be so wanting in candor as to assert the con-
trary.
Id. at 556-57. Harlan's argument also employs judicial notice, a technique that
Professor Charles Black advocated more than fifty years later in The Lawfulness
of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YAL L. J. 421 (1960).
[Vol. 25
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conscious use of social science through the Brandeis brief.' 5 As a result, by
the 1950s, courts were more comfortable with employing this type of extra-
legal evidence as witnessed by the Brown decision.
In addition to its place as one of the great decisions in terms of its use
of social science, Brown is also a good example of the point that knowl-
edge is gained and lost over time often because there are things we would
rather forget than confront. Most lawyers are familiar with the fact that the
Supreme Court noted a psychology study in Brown that related how black
children reacted when presented with white dolls.16 They are even familiar
with the fact that Brown was a consolidation of several different actions.1
7
Most, however, do not know the story of one of these actions, Briggs v.
Elliott.18 Nor are they aware of another study also cited by the Court, Gun-
nar Myrdal's American Dilemma.19
Clarendon County in South Carolina operated a segregated school sys-
tem. 20 Although not required by law, the county provided bus transporta-
tion to the rural white children attending schools in far away towns but did
not provide any transportation to black children who lived up to ten miles
from their place of education. Nor did the county provide heat or repair
services for the black children's schools. Instead, parents and teachers
were required to chop the wood and make the repairs themselves.
15. The Brandeis brief was first presented in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908). That case concerned whether Oregon State had the right to deny women access to
certain jobs. Brandeis relied on social science to show that women were at least arguably
weaker than men and more in need of government protection. He then used these findings
to argue that the Court should defer to the state legislature when the legislature had reason-
able grounds for creating protectionist legislation. See, e.g., Paul L. Rosen, THE SUPREME
COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1972).
16. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954); Kenneth B. Clark, Effect
of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development (Mid-century White House
Conference on Children and Youth) 1950.
17. Briggs v. Elliott on appeal from the Eastern District of South Carolina, Davis v.
County School Board of Prince Edward County on appeal from the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia, Gebhart v. Belton on certiorari from the Supreme Court of Delaware and, of course,
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka Kansas on appeal from the District Court of Kan-
sas.
18. 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. S.C., 1951); inj. Denied; 103 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. S.C.,
1952).
19. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY (1975). The original version of the study began in the late 1930s and
was published in 1944.
20. For a full discussion of the events leading up to the litigation in Briggs v. Elli-
ott, see J. A. DELAINE, BRIGGS V. ELLIoT,. CLARENDON COUNTY'S QUEST FOR EQUALITY
(2002).
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Because the county refused to transport their children, Clarendon
County's black parents bought a used school bus for $400 and, when that
bus was beyond repair, they bought another bus for $700. These amounts
represented more than many families made in a year. Their sacrifice
proved too costly, however, and they abandoned the bus when the costs of
repairs and gasoline became too dear.
Just at the time that the parents realized that they could no longer sus-
tain a private transportation system for their children, a young man
drowned while trying to cross a lake that separated the children from their
school. The parents were now afraid to let their children continue walking
to school as they too would have to cross the same lake that had caused the
young man's death. In desperation, they turned to Clarendon County for
help with the cost of maintaining the school bus. The county denied their
request, and it was this denial that led to Briggs v. Elliott.21
Gunnar Myrdal, the 1974 Nobel Prize winner in economics, was em-
ployed by the Carnegie Foundation in the late 1930s and early 1940s to
study the race question in the United States. The result was American Di-
lemma: the Negro Problem and Modem Democracy,22 a text of almost
21. Id. at 13-17.
22. Myrdal, supra note 19. E. Stina Lyon reports on American Dilemma in her
essay entitled Researching Race Relations: Myrdal's American Dilemma from a Human
Rights Perspective that:
In 1937, the Carnegie Corporation was in search of a social scientist to
direct a major scholarly inquiry into the state of race relations in the
United States. This research project was to become one of the largest
and most expensive social science investigations ever funded. The Car-
negie Corporation, a philanthropic organisation devoted to the support
of both research and social reform, had agreed 'to commission such a
study with the aim of producing as accurate, detailed and comprehen-
sive a picture as possible of the position of the 'Negro' in the US par-
ticularly with respect to educational issues. Its findings were to be di-
rected to interested parties across the political spectrum in both the
white and the black community, three quarters of which at the time still
lived in the deeply segregated South. The President of the Corporation,
Frederick Keppel, considered the project so charged with emotion and
political tension that only an 'outsider' to the US could be trusted to
bring it to credible fruition. Such an 'outsider' needed to come from a
democratic country preferably without an imperialist past and thus not
tainted by traditional 'colonial' attitudes to race. (Keppel, 1944, Lager-
man, 1987).... Very soon into the work, 'the Negro problem' that he
had been invited to study turned in his understanding into 'the White
man's problem,' thus turning the original question on its head. As he
noted in the introduction to the final report, during early visits to the
South he became 'shocked and scared to the bones' by what he saw of
violence, poverty and injustice and by the role of white Americans in
[Vol. 25
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1,400 pages that distilled another 20,000 pages of research on America's
race problem. In comparison to Kenneth Clark's doll study, Myrdal's work
is profoundly distressing. Each page contains another outrage against
American blacks. The end result is a portrait of a people so oppressed and
misused by their government and society that the reader's emotions swing
from anger to despair.
I bring up Briggs v. Elliott and Myrdal's American Dilemma in order
to illustrate how some facts endure while others fade from memory. The
story of Clarendon County's parents and their attempts to educate their
children is no less compelling than the stories we know about Brown v.
Board of Education, and for decades, American Dilemma was a much more
influential study than Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personal-
ity Development.23 But Kenneth Clark's study tells a prettier story about
race discrimination in which little children are affected by unseen forces,
and their major harm is that they select dolls that look different from them-
selves. This harm and its unseen causes are much easier to deal with than
1,400 pages of atrocities with identified perpetrators, just as the pretty Nor-
man Rockwell image we have of Brown v. Board of Education is much
more appealing than the story of parents forced to sue or see their children
die. Our lost memories of Briggs v. Elliott and American Dilemma demon-
strate this essay's theme: that social science is only useful before an action
is ever filed. Social science cannot change a judge's mind at the time of
trial; that mind must have been open long before the action is ever consid-
ered by a tribunal. By asserting that social science's influence comes be-
fore trial, I am not arguing against the use of social science. I am only
pointing out that changing people's outlooks takes a long time and many
studies over a series of years. Thus, social movements and the lawyers
who are interested in using social science must be willing to take a very
long-term view of what they seek to accomplish.
perpetuating it. (Myrdal, 1944: xxxv). Though most of the literature in
front of him on the 'Negro problem' dealt with Negroes, this was at
heart a problem of white racist attitudes and behavior .... Six years
later, in the midst of war, the final dense two volume 1,500 page report
was published under the title An American Dilemma: The Negro Prob-
lem and Modem Democracy. It was based on a synthesis of 20,000
pages of empirical evidence and included extensive methodological ap-
pendices.
London South Bank University, Faculty of Arts and Human Sciences, Working
Papers Series at
http://www.lsbu.ac.uk/ahs/research/reports/lyon/lyonl7contents.shtml.
23. Clark, supra note 16.
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A recent illustration of this need to take the long-term view is Grutter
v. Bollinger and its amicus briefs.24 Some of the briefs dealt with the needs
of United States' industry for culturally-sensitive workers in the new global
25economy. Others dealt with national security and the military's need for
trained minority officers supplied by ROTC.26 But only Justice Clarence
Thomas' dissent dealt directly with the damning evidence submitted about
the racial effects of the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT).27
Only Justice Thomas' dissent had the courage to ask why elite law
schools have the right to both use racially-discriminatory tests as the major
part of their admissions process and then ask the Court to allow them to use
another process to undo the harm caused by the first.28 As Justice Thomas
pointed out, reliance on the LSAT in law school admissions encourages the
belief that the bulk of law school admissions are merit-based, with some
odd exception for minorities.29 In other areas of law, we do not tolerate the
use of tests to determine qualifications when the tests themselves are ra-
cially flawed.3 °
The fight against the LSAT and its sister examinations has just begun,
and the fact that only one in nine Justices understood the ill-effects of these
tests does not mean that the social science behind the arguments against
these examinations is useless. What the failure to successfully attack the
LSAT in this forum means is that there is more work to be done in the
court of public opinion. We must recapture the memories of the times
when great lawyers were produced without the aid of standardized exami-
nations. These are truths that are hard to see in a world filled with the so-
cial science of standardized tests and their "neutral" pursuit of "merit."
They are particularly hard to fight when many powerful opinion leaders are
themselves successful veterans of these very tests. Nevertheless, this is one
24. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
25. Id. at 334. Elvia Ariola's article from the Association of American Law
Schools' Workshop on Racial Justice deals extensively with these briefs.
26. Id.
27. Brief of Amici Curiae Society of American Law Teachers for Respondent,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
28. Id. at 336.
29. Id. at 337.
30. Owen M. Fiss, in Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, in MODERN
CONSTITUIONAL THEORY: A READER 470 (John H. Garvey et al. eds., 4th ed. 1999). I am
indebted to Professor Jose Roberto Juarez for pointing out in his paper for the Association
of American Law Schools' Workshop on Racial Justice that Justice Thomas' ability to un-
derstand this fact when the rest of the Court remains oblivious might well result from the
Justice's prior experience with the EEOC.
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of the battlegrounds in the fight for social justice at the moment and the one
that the lawyer for social justice must work on with the social scientist as
the battle continues.
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